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Abstract 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s New Fiscal Plan’s debt sustainability analysis is evaluated 
in conjunction with existing metrics and frameworks for understanding debt sustainability. This 
includes the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Framework and the rating agencies’ methodologies in 
rating General Obligation bonds. Different peer comparison groups— sovereign nations, U.S. 
states, and municipalities— and their relevant statistics are considered and discussed. This paper 
proposes a peer group of municipalities, specifically of the City of Detroit, to establish a 
sustainable level of debt for Puerto Rico. Ratio metrics are calculated from the City of Detroit’s 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports to offer a comparative look at Puerto Rico’s debt 
levels. All metrics demonstrate that Puerto Rico’s current debt obligations must be greatly 
adjusted to result in a successful restructuring and feasible plan moving forward. 
 
Keywords: Puerto Rico, framework, debt sustainability analysis 
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Introduction 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis brought many issues to light. Given its 
status as a U.S. territory, prior to the implementation of PROMESA, Puerto Rico had no access 
to any debt restructuring mechanisms to address their financial distress. With Title III of 
PROMESA, a procedure and a federal oversight board was established to give Puerto Rico a 
method to address the restructuring of their debt and a process to expedite the approval of critical 
infrastructure projects. While largely based off Chapter 9 bankruptcy, Title III most notably 
included a fiscal plan requirement. 
In this paper, existing frameworks and benchmarks for determining a sustainable level of 
debt are utilized to evaluate the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to better understand how much 
debt needs to be restructured. The restructuring process will ensure that future debt service 
payments can be met while ideally still allowing for Puerto Rican economic growth. This is 
necessary during bankruptcy proceedings in order to argue for a greater restructuring of debt to 
ensure Puerto Rico is on the path of recovery.  
This paper also proposes for municipalities, specifically the City of Detroit, to be 
considered as an important additional point of comparison when establishing a baseline for the 
extent of debt that Puerto Rico can sustain. Given the similarity of their experiences in 
population loss, default on debt, and loss of local financial control, Detroit offers valuable insight 
into what is potentially feasible for an exit out of bankruptcy and then towards the path of 
recovery. The analysis reveals that Puerto Rico must restructure a large portion of its current debt 
obligations in order to be sustainable in the long run. 
The literature review demonstrates how much of the research in the realm of Puerto Rico 
is disparate, and few papers address the topic of debt sustainability. As such, this paper 
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contributes to the limited discussion surrounding the evaluation of Puerto Rico’s debt capacity 
and the actions that need to be taken to ensure its future sustainability. 
 
Methodology 
Primarily using Puerto Rico’s New Fiscal Plan of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
(“New Fiscal Plan”), approved October 2018, this paper evaluates the debt sustainability analysis 
presented in the plan in conjunction with other existing frameworks. The New Fiscal Plan’s 
projections and assumptions are held to be true in this paper, such that the ratio metrics produced 
on Puerto Rico in the New Fiscal Plan are utilized in the analysis and comparisons. The other 
various debt sustainability frameworks, including the Government Finance Officers 
Association’s Budgeting Series for municipalities and the International Monetary Fund’s 
guidance notes on debt sustainability frameworks for sovereignties, serve as another basis for 
evaluating Puerto Rico’s debt levels. 
This paper’s proposal to use Detroit as a comparison to Puerto Rico relies heavily on the 
City of Detroit’s Comprehensive Annual Fiscal Plans to compute ratio metrics for Detroit for the 
years during and following its exit out of bankruptcy. These indicators are then used to evaluate 
Puerto Rico’s current debt level and potential debt capacity with Detroit’s sustained debt burden.  
These measures of debt capacity provide evidence that Puerto Rico’s debt levels are 
beyond sustainable on all measures and that drastic reform is necessary. The academic literature 
provides the context for this debt sustainability analysis, to establish an understanding of where 
this paper contributes to the conversation. 
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Literature Review on Puerto Rico 
For background information on municipal bankruptcy, see Appendix A. For a brief 
history on the progression of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis and PROMESA, see Appendix B. For a 
summary of the causal factors in Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy, see Appendix C. 
 
Literature on Puerto Rico 
The research on Puerto Rico has primarily been disparate rather than in conversation with 
each other. In the academic literature surrounding the Puerto Rican government, most of the 
earlier research that exists explores the historical progression of Puerto Rico’s economy as 
institutional and political factors changed.1 There is also substantial work on the legal status of 
Puerto Rico in its relation to the United States as a territory.2  
More recently, researchers have begun to evaluate the debt crisis and the options the 
government has in order to resolve the issues at hand, including arguing for bankruptcy law 
through evaluating what it can and cannot do3 and proposing a two-step strategy of an oversight 
board and a mechanism for adjusting debts4. Cooper, Barefoot, McBridge, and Pietrantoni use 
that investigation as a method of providing an expectation of how the crisis will progress, 
arguing that the Puerto Rican administration and the oversight board would choose to utilize 
                                                 
1 Dietz, James L. Economic history of Puerto Rico: institutional change and capitalist development. Princeton 
University Press, 2018. 
2 Leibowitz, Arnold H. Defining status: A comprehensive analysis of United States territorial relations. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1989. 
3 Pottow, John A. E., What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico (June 1, 2016). Rev. Jur. UPR 85, 
no. 3 (2016): 689-704; U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-017; U of Michigan Public Law 
Research Paper No. 517. 
4 Gillette, Clayton P., and David A. Skeel. "A Two-Step Plan for Puerto Rico." U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ 
Research Paper16-3 (2016). 
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Title III of PROMESA as opposed to Title VI.5 In a different paper, Cooper, Barefoot, Soltman 
and Pietrantoni identifies two legal mechanisms for the Commonwealth to reform its public 
pension systems and recommends Title III proceedings.6 These works, however, were either 
written prior to the implementation of PROMESA, as it stands currently, or do not evaluate how 
it is panning out.  
After the initial implementation, much less research and analysis can be found on the 
present implementation of Title III and the New Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth. There are 
some arguments on the power of Congress in its reach over the Commonwealth7 as well as an 
analysis of the treatment of subnational governments in cases of financial distress, including that 
of states and Puerto Rico.8 There is an argument made regarding the regressive nature of 
PROMESA’s choice in containing no formal role for bankruptcy judges with experience in 
dealing with government debt, utilizing instead a district judge without putting forth 
circumstances in which a district judge may enlist help from bankruptcy judges.9 Lubben 
analyzes PROMESA in context with the Bankruptcy Clause, arguing that there is inconsistency 
as Title III of PROMESA violates the Clause by being applied too narrowly.10 Once again, 
however, these do not examine the actualized implications of Title III as it has been 
                                                 
5 Cooper, Richard, Luke Barefoot, Jessica McBride, and Antonio Pietrantoni. "Issues To Expect In A Title III Puerto 
Rico Restructuring." (2017). 
6 Cooper, Richard, Luke Barefoot, Daniel Soltman, and Antonio Pietrantoni. "Disarming Puerto Rico's Pension 
Time Bomb." (2017). 
7 Gulati, Mitu, and Robert K. Rasmussen. "Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring." S. 
Cal. L. Rev.91 (2017): 133. 
8 Block, Cheryl D. "Federal policy for financially-distressed subnational governments: the US states and Puerto 
Rico." Wash. UJL & Pol'y 53 (2017): 215. 
9 Jacoby, Melissa B. "Presiding over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto Rico." Am. Bankr. LJ 91 
(2017): 375. 
10 Lubben, Stephen J. "PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity." Brook. J. Corp. 
Fin. & Com. L.12 (2017): 53. 
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implemented, such as the consequences of the New Fiscal Plan’s cash flow projections for the 
Commonwealth or its authorities, merely pointing out potential areas of concern. 
Recent working papers have addressed the Puerto Rican debt crisis through financial 
lenses. Chari, Leary, and Phan have evaluated the impact of anticipation of Puerto Rico’s default 
on its measures of risk, finding significantly higher employment growth declines in government 
demand and external finance dependent industries with default risk exposure.11 Their event study 
analysis confirms that the increased default risk also increases the cost of capital for both the 
Puerto Rican government and its publicly traded firms. A PhD dissertation looked at the pricing 
of contract provisions, as affected by credit risk, and the economic effects of (sub) sovereign 
default risk.12 Investors were found to price contract provisions most when credit risk was 
highest. In agreement with Chari, Leary, and Phan, increased default risk was found to reduce 
employment, cause divergence of Puerto Rico’s economy from the rest of the U.S. and increase 
the cost of capital. Both these analyses offer a quantitative look at the effects of subsovereign 
default risk on various aspects of the market, but do not evaluate PROMESA, restructuring deals, 
or the New Fiscal Plans.  
Some of the more recent and relevant works on Puerto Rico are written by Skeel, Park, 
Samples, Cooper, Barefoot, Brenneman, McBride, and Pietrantoni. Skeel reflects on the 
developments that allowed PROMESA to be enacted in its current form: the rise of oversight 
boards with New York City’s crisis and the subsequent D.C. Control Board, and the increased 
use of Chapter 9 to resolve municipal distress of notable cities.13 He also reflects on the 
                                                 
11 Chari, Anusha, Ryan Leary, and Toan Phan. The costs of (sub) sovereign default risk: Evidence from puerto rico. 
No. w24108. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. 
12 Leary, Ryan Michael. "Two Papers on Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis." PhD diss., The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, 2018. 
13 Skeel, David A. "Reflections on Two Years of PROMESA." (2018). 
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experience in being on the Federal Oversight Board both before Hurricane Maria and afterwards, 
addressing criticisms on the decision making of the boards. While Skeel’s article address the 
current implementation of PROMESA, it is primarily focused on the Federal Oversight Board. 
Park and Samples’ article analyzes private creditor engagement in Puerto Rico’s 
restructuring, arguing that the case may offer insights into creditor engagements and 
coordination for sovereign debt restructuring processes.14 In doing so, he assesses the potential 
impact of PROMESA on debtor-creditor cooperation, specifically through the Puerto Rico 
Electric Power Authority (PREPA) bond restructuring. While this presents the dynamics of 
negotiations and engagement, it doesn’t analyze the fiscal assumptions of the restructuring deal 
and is written prior to the completion of the first consensual deal with creditors in November 
2018. 
Cooper, Barefoot, Brenneman, and Pietrantoni’s look at PROMESA reveals that the 
certified fiscal plans for reform foresee private-public partnerships (PPPs) playing a large role in 
Puerto Rico’s turnaround.15 They argue that these PPP projects may contribute to long-term 
growth although the difficulty of these projects are large in the face of capital, legal and 
operational uncertainties. Accordingly, the restructuring tools under Title III of PROMESA can 
help facilitate these transactions and possibility mitigate some risks through the structures they 
analyze, including DIP financing and pledging special revenues. Cooper, Barefoot, and McBride 
also offer recommendations to the Commonwealth for what should be offered to creditors in the 
restructuring deal.16 They present four recommendations for the reconstituted debt, arguing that 
                                                 
14 Park, Stephen Kim, and Tim R. Samples. "Puerto Rico's Debt Dilemma and Pathways Toward Sovereign 
Solvency." American Business Law Journal 54, no. 1 (2017): 9-60. 
15 Cooper, Richard, Luke Barefoot, Adam Brenneman, and Antonio Pietrantoni. "Turning Bust to Boom: 
PROMESA and Puerto Rico's Public-Private Partnership Initiatives." Law360, July 19 (2017). 
16 Cooper, Richard, Luke Barefoot, and Jessica McBride. "What Should Puerto Rico Offer Its Creditors?." (2017). 
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the form and nature of the restructuring may be more important than the size of the debt that 
creditors will receive on the dollar. Most notably, they recommend a “growth bond” or a 
contingent value instrument in order to give creditors the opportunity to recoup their losses while 
also participating in the future upside of economic growth and recovery. While these articles do 
look at the implications of PROMESA, they are not directly comparative to municipal finance in 
how the processes play out. They also do not offer a look at the current general obligation and 
revenue bonds or offer an evaluation of what is or can be sustainable. 
Caraballo-Cueto and Lara’s extensive analysis covers how the deindustrialization of 
Puerto Rico created a structural change in the economy, consequently shaping Puerto Rico’s 
current debt crisis. 17 The authors demonstrate how the tax-incentivized industrialization created 
an unsustainable system. They point out how the deindustrialization process, triggered by the 
change in U.S. tax system, and the island’s government and private sector’s inability to quickly 
adapt led to declining economic production, decreasing the government revenues and increasing 
debt. While the research presents a look at the progression and causes of the debt crisis, it does 
not evaluate the current debt or fiscal sustainability of Puerto Rico. 
The most relevant literature is a working paper by Gluzmann, Guzman and Stiglitz.18 The 
authors examine the macroeconomic implications and assumptions of Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Plan, 
and they perform a stochastic debt sustainability analysis that is consistent with the 
macroeconomic dynamics put forth by the Fiscal Plan. Their analysis provides evidence that the 
Plan is based on “assumptions that are not aligned with economic theory or evidence”, including 
the Plan’s overly optimistic values of fiscal multipliers used in GNP projections. Furthermore, 
                                                 
17 Caraballo-Cueto, Jose, and Juan Lara. "Deindustrialization and Unsustainable Debt in Middle-Income Countries: 
The Case of Puerto Rico." Journal of Globalization and Development 8, no. 2 (2017): 1-11. 
18 Gluzmann, Pablo A., Martin M. Guzman, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. An Analysis of Puerto Rico's Debt Relief Needs 
to Restore Debt Sustainability. No. w25256. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. 
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their debt sustainability analysis computes the amount of debt relief necessary to restore Puerto 
Rico’s public debt sustainability, keeping in line with the Fiscal Plan’s assumptions. The 
calculations show that the necessary debt reduction is a substantial percentage of the relevant 
debt stock, depending on which assumptions for fiscal multipliers and structural reform effects 
are used. The percentages of the relevant debt stock that must be reduced ranges from 44.4% to 
79.9%. This is a considerable amount of debt write-off and is even considered conservative by 
the authors on the side of “too little” debt relief. The relevant statistics from this research will be 
analyzed in further detail in the analysis presented below to serve as a comparison for the 
proposed comparable group analysis. 
 
Comparative Literature on Puerto Rico and Greece 
While no literature exists that directly compares the implementation of Puerto Rican 
proceedings with Chapter 9 proceedings, there does exist some comparative literature on Puerto 
Rico and Greece. A publication from the Centre for European Policy Studies points out the 
similarities in both cases using economic and social indicators like GNP per capita, public 
debt/revenues and poverty rates.19 It concludes that the differences between the two cases lie in 
the political contexts. For Greece, liquidity provisions and debt problems are controlled by 
official institutions while in Puerto Rico, they are determined by the market. Thus, while Greece 
must work in conjunction with the power of other political institutions, Puerto Rico’s issue lies 
more with anonymous investors and market forces. 
                                                 
19 Gros, Daniel. Puerto Rico and Greece: A tale of two defaults in a monetary union. No. 10709. Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2015. 
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Pantojas-Garcia takes a slightly different route, noting that while both instances of 
financial distress were rooted in bad governance, they differ significantly “in the contexts, 
nature, and magnitude of their debts”.20 He argues consequently that the Puerto Rican crisis is 
ultimately one of poor governance, and the solution thus must also include something greater 
than a mere bandage onto the wound. He claims federal assistance and debt restructuring are not 
sufficient for a long-term solution, recommending that reform include “a redefinition of the 
status of Puerto Rico and a cleansing from the corrupt political elite that has ruled the island over 
the past two and a half decades”.21 
 
Debt Sustainability Frameworks 
Concepts in Fiscal and Debt Sustainability 
 To understand whether a government is suffering a structural deficit that will potentially 
lead to a fiscal crisis, it is often a simple accounting question. In coming to understand the 
government as a service provider, there are two sides of the equation: revenues and expenses. 
Revenues include taxes, fees, and federal grants-in-aid. Expenses include spending on 
programmatic services and contractual obligations from public employee wages, benefits, and 
pension plans.22 Simply put, the maximum tax revenues must exceed the total mandated 
spending less the amount of aid receive less other revenues to prevent a fiscal crisis. 
                                                 
20 Pantojas-García, Emilio. "Is Puerto Rico Greece in the Caribbean: Crisis, Colonialism, and 
Globalization." Fletcher F. World Aff. 40 (2016): 57. 
21 See Pantojas-Garcia, Emilio. "Is Puerto Rico Greece in the Caribbean: Crisis, Colonialism, and Globalization." 
68. 
22 Inman, Robert P. "How to have a fiscal crisis: lessons from Philadelphia." The American Economic Review 85, no. 
2 (1995): 378-383. 
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 While fiscal sustainability evaluates whether the government is suffering from a 
structural deficit from being consistently unable to pay for its expenses without borrowing, debt 
sustainability is whether the government can keep up with its debt service payments. Fiscal 
sustainability, thus, is inclusive of debt sustainability as the calculated expenses include and go 
beyond contractual debt obligations.  
 In other words, the net present value (NPV) of the government’s future revenues must be 
at least as high as the NPV of the outstanding government debt to have debt sustainability. The 
NPV of the government’s future revenues must be at least as high as the NPV of the 
government’s future expenses, including that of debt service, to be fiscally sustainable. This 
equivalence criteria between the present value of liabilities in comparison to the present value of 
assets is also referred to as the “stock concept”. As long as the government is able to generate 
sufficient primary budget surpluses to repay outstanding debt, the government is sufficient 
“solvent” and debt sustainable. 
 A debt capacity analysis attempts to strike a balance between a government’s capital 
needs and its ability to pay. When forward-looking, the analysis helps a government ensure that 
the debt it issues is affordable and cost-effective. In a restructuring process like Chapter 9, a debt 
capacity analysis can help determine if outstanding debt is sustainable and can be used to 
ultimately determine feasibility when proposing an adjustment of debt.23 For instance, in the case 
of Detroit, “Is it likely that the City of Detroit, after the confirmation of the Plan of Adjustment, 
will be able to sustainably provide basic municipal services to the citizens of Detroit and to meet 
the obligations contemplated in the Plan without the significant probability of a default?”24 
                                                 
23 "An Answer to the Question: What Is Feasbiility in Chapter 9." Phoenix Managment Services. 
http://www.phoenixmanagement.com/pdf/WhatisFeasibilityinChapter9WhitePaper.pdf. 
24 See “An Answer to the Question”. 3. 
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Common Metrics in a Debt Sustainability Analysis 
 The process for measuring debt sustainability typically involves a ratio metrics analysis 
as debt indicators. The Government Finance Officers Association’s (GFAO) framework for 
measuring debt capacity, the recommended budget practices of the National Advisory Council 
on State and Local Budgeting (NACSLB), involves the following steps: determining objectives, 
data collection, debt indicator construction, peer group construction, comparing key indicators 
against the peer group, establishing debt issuance scenario, utilizing break-even year 
methodology, and developing/revising formal debt policy. 
 There are a few common indicators within the GFAO framework that can be used to 
measure debt. They can generally be separated into two categories: debt outstanding 
measurements and debt service measurements. Whereas debt outstanding measures the present 
value of the total amount of principal that must be paid, debt service is the amount of payment 
that includes both principal and interest (and potentially new debt issuance fees) that must be 
allocated as its own expenditure on a regular budgetary basis. Key metrics include but are not 
limited to debt outstanding per capita, debt outstanding per capita as percentage of personal 
income per capita, debt service as percentage of property tax revenue, debt service per capital, 
debt service per capita as percentage of personal income per capita, and debt service as 
percentage of general fund budgeted expenditures.  
 The Mercatus Center at George Mason University’s ranking of the states by fiscal 
condition utilizes thirteen separate financial metrics: cash ratio, quick ratio, current ratio, 
operating ratio, surplus per capita, net asset ratio, long-term liability ratio, long-term liability per 
capita, taxes to income, revenue to income, expenses to income, pension affordability ratio, and 
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other post-employment benefits affordability ratio.25 Not all metrics are equally significant or 
reflective of impending financial distress, but they do reveal a component of the overall fiscal 
condition. 
 Comparison groups are effectively established based on shared characteristics to offer a 
baseline or viable comparison for a government’s debt burden. GFAO puts forth that a 
comparison group can be established on the basis of population, geographic region, or 
alternatively, on the basis of a similarity of experience. Designing the best comparison group is 
important when attempting to use it as the grounds for changing debt policies or restructuring 
debt burden to a sustainable level. 
 Not all debt sustainability analyses use comparison groups to establish thresholds or 
benchmarks for an appropriate level of debt. Certain frameworks like the IMF Framework and 
rating agencies’ approach evaluates the present debt burden in conjunction with other 
macroeconomic projections to label the government’s risk of debt distress or ability to carry debt 
based on its own thresholds and benchmarks. They may also conduct individualized analyses to 
customize thresholds to a government’s own policies. While those frameworks are 
complementary and important to consider when conducting any given debt sustainability 
analysis, the comparative approach presents empirical evidence to what has worked or not 
worked in the past. Comparisons offer a look at the levels of debt burden that similar 
governments faced through distress, through the restructuring process, and while on their way to 
recovery. This gives a different perspective for any crisis at hand.  
 Given that any debt restructuring plan or sustainability analysis is subject to stochastic 
variations, there is no clear delineation of what is feasible and what is not. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
25 Norcross, Eileen, and Olivia Gonzalez. "Ranking the states by fiscal condition." Mercatus Research Paper (2018). 
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important to consider not only what various models that are predicated on a given number of 
assumptions project, but also what has previously worked for different governments in a 
comparable situation. 
 
IMF Debt Sustainability Thresholds 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) and 
various rating agencies’ methodologies seek to establish the feasibility and “health” of an 
entity’s debt outstanding on an individual basis. 
 The IMF and World Bank developed DSF for low-income countries, which was 
introduced in April 2005 and reviewed periodically to update when necessary. The IMF also has 
a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) tool for market-access countries. The two approaches differ 
in that market-access countries have established access to international capital markets whereas 
low-income countries must meet financing options through concessional financing, which have 
more generous terms than market loans. 
 For low-income countries, the IMF DSA is conducted regularly to assess the risk of 
external and overall debt distress. The DSA analyzes a country’s projected debt burden over the 
following ten years and conducts a baseline analysis with stress tests to determine its 
vulnerability to economic and policy shocks.26 The DSA also includes an assessment based on 
certain debt burden thresholds and benchmarks, which may vary depending on country-specific 
circumstances. 
                                                 
26 "Factsheet - The Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries." IMF. 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/39/Debt-Sustainability-Framework-for-Low-
Income-Countries. 
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 The analysis includes both external and public sector debt. Whereas external debt is the 
total amount of debt owed by the government and the private sector— including corporations 
and individuals— to a foreign creditor, public sector debt, which is also known as national debt, 
is the accumulated level of debt owed by the government. Public debt is created through the 
issuance of bonds in order to compensate for a budgetary or fiscal deficit. 
 While the IMF framework evaluates both national debt and external debt, the more 
relevant metric of analysis here in the context of Puerto Rico would be of national debt. The IMF 
framework presents varied ratings for risk of external public debt: low, moderate, high, debt 
distress. Debt distress is usually evidenced by outstanding debt payments, ongoing or impending 
debt restructuring. The DSF classifies countries into three different debt-carrying capacity 
categories (“strong”, “medium”, “weak”) using a composite indicator based on country’s 
historical performance and outlook for real growth, reserves coverage, remittance inflows, state 
of global environment and World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
index. In Exhibit #1, the World Bank and IMF presents the thresholds based on a country’s 
categorization and flags those with significant public domestic debt to assess the overall risk of 
public debt distress. High thresholds indicate a strong performer— a country that has good 
macroeconomic performance and policies— that can handle greater amounts of debt. 
 PV of total public debt as percent of GDP 
Weak 35 
Medium 55 
Strong 70 
Exhibit #1: Debt Burden Thresholds and Benchmarks under the DSF 
Source: Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries27 
 
                                                 
27 See “Factsheet – The Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries.” 
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 Although Puerto Rico is not a low-income country, it is interesting to compare Puerto 
Rico with the thresholds that the IMF has put forth. Since Puerto Rico’s Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFRs) are unavailable, cumulative deficits may be around 60 to 70 billion. 
While exact numbers are uncertain, the New Fiscal Plan of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
from October 2018 estimates over $70 billion in public debt. Utilizing Kobre & Kim LLC’s 
Final Report that approximates $74 billion of bond debt and $48 billion of unfunded pension 
obligations28, and a GNP of 70.6 billion which has declined over 14% since 200729, the PV of 
total public debt as a percent of GNP is around 172.8%. While GNP differs from GDP, GNP is 
used as a better measure of the economic value generated within the island since much of the 
island’s economic profits gets “exported” to mainland U.S.  
 Puerto Rico’s ratio metric is much greater than the 70% threshold for even the strongest 
low-income countries. Reinhard and Rogoff’s research titled “Growth in a Time of Debt” finds 
that GDP growth cuts nearly in half when levels external debt are excess of 90% of GDP.30 They 
do not distinguish between total external debt thresholds and public debt thresholds in their 
research. While there is a lot of contention surrounding this finding, high debt is still found to 
correlate with low growth, although there are always exceptions.31 In looking at 90% as a very 
rough threshold, Puerto Rico’s ratio metric for public debt is still higher. This suggests that on all 
measures, Puerto Rico’s debt is unsustainable. This assessment, however, is a very crude one 
since Puerto Rico and sovereigns have access to very different capital markets. Sovereign 
governments also have the capability to control their own currency through monetary policy, 
                                                 
28 Kobre & Kim LLP, Independent Investor’s Final Investigative Report, August 20, 2018. 
29 Economic Development Bank for Puerto Rico. Office of Economic Studies. Puerto Rico Annual Fact Sheet. 
October 2018. http://www.aafaf.pr.gov/assets/pr-factsheet-oct2018-aafaf.pdf. 
30 Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. "Growth in a Time of Debt." American Economic Review 100, no. 
2 (2010): 573-78. 
31 Alexander, Ruth. "Reinhart, Rogoff... and Herndon: The Student Who Caught out the Profs." BBC News. April 
20, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22223190. 
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which affects borrowing rates and money supply, whereas Puerto Rico cannot control such 
things as it shares the currency with the U.S. mainland. 
 
Sovereign Nations as Comparable Peers 
 As mentioned previously, a comparative debt sustainability analysis (DSA) is informed 
by the debt sustained by the most appropriate peer group to benchmark a specific governmental 
entity. Relevant metrics for that benchmark group are then applied to said governmental entity, 
to assess its appropriate debt levels in light of its long-term macroeconomic and revenue 
projections. Although Puerto Rico is not a sovereign, it still may be insightful to evaluate the 
Commonwealth’s debt burden relative to the most similar sovereign nation’s sustained debt 
levels. 
 Since Puerto Rico cannot control its own currency nor request funding from the IMF, and 
the Commonwealth’s public debt market is separate, the IMF framework is a flawed benchmark 
for Puerto Rico by itself. The New Fiscal Plan recognizes the distinction in debt markets and 
monetary flexibility, so it offers E.U. sovereigns as the most comparable out of all sovereigns, as 
they similarly cannot control their own currency.32 
 When evaluating Puerto Rico’s public debt levels in comparison to the existing debt 
levels of E.U. countries, through the net tax-supported debt as a percentage of its own collected 
revenues and the gross public debts a percentage of its GNP, Puerto Rico’s debt levels greatly 
supersede those of E.U. nations, even surpassing Slovenia’s high debt burden. This is displayed 
in Exhibit #2.  
                                                 
32 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, As certified by the Financial Oversight Board 
for Puerto Rico.https://drive.google.com/file/d/17ca0ALe7vpYn0jEzTz3RfykpsFSM0ujK/view. 
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Exhibit #2: European Union Sovereigns as Comparable 
Source: The New Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico33 
 
These comparative results demonstrate the necessity for Puerto Rico to restructure its debt to a 
significantly lower level.  
 While Greece may seem like it is a comparable peer within the sovereign nations’ 
context, its current situation does not suggest a successful recovery upon its exit out of the 
bailout program. It is uncertain whether Greece is even on the path to recovery.34 As such, it 
cannot serve as a viable comparison for what amount of debt is sustainable. On the contrary, it 
demonstrates that such a high level of debt is unsustainable.  
 Even if Greece can be deemed on its way to recovery, as previously mentioned, the 
Center for European Policy Studies concluded that the cases of Greece and Puerto Rico differed 
                                                 
33 See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 37. 
34 Pelagidis, Theodore, and Theodore Pelagidis. "Greece: Eurozone's Puerto Rico." Brookings. June 06, 2017. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/06/greece-eurozones-puerto-rico/. 
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in that Greece must work in conjunction with the power of other official institutions while Puerto 
Rico’s issue is carried out in court with investors and subject to general market forces. 35 Such a 
comparison would have drastic political and administrative differences. 
 While the New Fiscal Plan includes an evaluation of the Eurozone’s countries, the use of 
existing sovereigns’ debt ratios is an imperfect comparison for Puerto Rico, so this analysis 
should only be considered in conjunction with other potential comparison groups. 
 
U.S. States as Comparable Peers 
 The New Fiscal Plan, approved October 23, 2018, outlines a rough debt sustainability 
analysis by using U.S. states as the comparison group for benchmarking a sustainable debt level 
for Puerto Rico. Within the analysis, the percentage of net tax-supported debt, net tax-supported 
debt to state personal income, net tax-supported debt per capita, and debt service as a percentage 
of all Commonwealth-collected revenues are all compared to the lowest 10 states’ average, the 
U.S. average, and the highest 10 states’ average. 
 The reasoning within the New Fiscal Plan for using states as a rough comparison group 
for Puerto Rico effectively argues against using sovereigns as a comparison group. Like U.S. 
states, Puerto Rico does not control its own currency. The Commonwealth also has no access to 
IMF restructuring support programs or other similar relief funding packages that are traditionally 
available to sovereigns. Instead, the public debt market that Puerto Rico has access to is the same 
as those used by states: the long-term municipal bond market. Furthermore, the same rating 
agencies that conduct analysis and assign ratings to the U.S. states do the same for Puerto Rico. 
                                                 
35 Gros, Daniel. “Puerto Rico and Greece: A tale of two defaults in a monetary union.” No. 10709. Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2015. 
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However, much of this reasoning, instead of positively arguing in favor of states, merely rejects 
sovereigns as a viable comparison group without effectively considering municipalities as a 
possible alternative approach. 
 There are a few glaring issues that the New Fiscal Plan acknowledges with this choice of 
using states as the comparable peer group for debt sustainability. First, unlike U.S. states, Puerto 
Rican residents do not pay federal income taxes. Although Puerto Ricans pay Social Security and 
Medicare taxes, the Commonwealth receives less federal support for some of its largest spending 
programs, such as Medicaid and transportation. The New Fiscal Plan points out how federal 
reimbursement levels for Puerto Rico fall considerably below the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP) and federal highway reimbursement levels provided to comparably-sized 
and wealthier states. This affects the way that states are able to budget in comparison to Puerto 
Rico. 
 It’s worth noting that Puerto Rico’s local graduated income tax brackets are comparable 
to federal income tax rates, providing the Commonwealth with revenue to fund local services. 
They are comparable in that the taxes are about the same share of personal income, albeit the 
taxes paid per capita are much lower in Puerto Rico than in the States. This demonstrates how 
Puerto Rico’s average income is much lower, resulting in a smaller tax base than in the States. 
 If federal income taxes are introduced, it may be that Puerto Rico will not be able to tax 
its own citizens as much, given that the overall average tax rate will increase. Given the 
theoretical framework of a tax revenue hill, increasing tax rates do not always result in higher tax 
revenues, as tax bases change when collection and evasion rates change. Hence, Puerto Rico may 
have less taxing ability with the addition of federal income taxes. 
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 Some have argued, however, that the Commonwealth’s relatively low per-capita income 
levels would place most Puerto Ricans in a tax bracket where they would pay little or no federal 
income tax. In 2005, Puerto Rico’s per capita GNP was roughly $14,000 in comparison to 
$41,000 for the U.S. mainland.36 This would effectively not impact the Commonwealth’s taxing 
ability on the majority of Puerto Ricans. All this is to evaluate the comparability of the 
Commonwealth’s tax revenues to that of the States, such that the viability of a comparison in the 
various ratios (percentage of net tax-supported debt, net tax-supported debt to state personal 
income, net tax-supported debt per capita, and debt service as a percentage of all 
Commonwealth-collected revenues) can be determined. 
 In the New Fiscal Plan, the use of the U.S. states as a comparable peer group led to the 
conclusion that Puerto Rico’s current debt levels were significantly higher than the sustained 
debt levels of the States on all ratio metrics. Utilizing Moody’s Investors Service reports on state 
debt ratio averages from 2018, the New Fiscal Plan generated Exhibit #3. 
                                                 
36 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Puerto Rico: Fiscal Relations with the Federal Government and 
Economic Trends during the Phaseout of the Possessions Tax Credit. GAO-06-541 (Washington, DC, 2006). 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157687.pdf. 
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Exhibit #3: U.S. States as Comparable 
Source: The New Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico37 
 
 
Exhibit #4: Revised U.S. States as Comparable 
                                                 
37 See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 36. 
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Source: Revised Draft of the New Fiscal Plan, Proposed by the Governor of Puerto Rico38 
 
 In March, the Commonwealth’s Governor submitted a revised Fiscal Plan for approval to 
the Oversight Board. The approximate net-tax supported debt is seen to have decreased from $45 
billion to $41 billion where the net of COFINA debt, subject to its own Plan of Adjustment, has 
increased from $27 billion to $28 billion. Given the decrease in net-tax supported debt, the ratio 
metrics evaluated have decreased. However, as seen in the Exhibit #4, placed here for 
comparison purposes, Puerto Rico’s debt levels still greatly surpass that of the its state 
comparison groups. 
 
Municipality Thresholds 
 Rating agencies also have their own frameworks to rate a debt issuance, based off the 
government’s current financial stability and its level of risk to shocks and fluctuations against its 
revenues and expenditures. Moody’s methodology considers the size, strength and diversity of 
the local economy and its tax base to measure the ability of the government to generate 
revenues.39 It also considers finances, management, debt and pension liabilities of the local 
government. Scores are assigned to sub-factors, converted to a numerical value, and then 
assigned a rating. 
 Standard and Poor’s (S&P) assigns ratings to municipal-issued general obligation bonds 
based on seven key factors’ scores: institutional framework, economy, management, budgetary 
flexibility, budgetary performance, liquidity, and debt and contingent liabilities.40 Each factor is 
                                                 
38 Governor of Puerto Rico. Revised Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico, As submitted to the Financial Oversight and 
Management Board for Puerto Rico. http://www.aafaf.pr.gov/assets/revised-fiscal-plan-for-pr-03-27-2019.pdf. 35. 
39 Moody’s Investors Service. “US Local Government Obligation Debt.” Rating Methodology. 
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_1041877. 
40 S&P Global Ratings. “U.S. Public Finance: U.S. Local government General Obligation Ratings: Methodology and 
Assumptions.” 2018. https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/8188093 
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scored from 1, being the strongest, to 5, being the weakest. These scores are combined in a 
weighted average to create an overall rating. The institution framework score assesses the 
municipalities’ predictability, revenue and expenditure balance, transparency and accountability, 
and system support. The economic score evaluates the health of the tax base and likelihood for 
increased service demands that result from decreased economic activity. The other factors 
evaluate the management practices of the government, the flexibility to raise additional revenues 
or reduce expenditures and the current fiscal state of the government. 
 With S&P, there are a few key general obligation credit ratios that contribute to their 
analysis and ratings. In Exhibit #5, the metrics of debt service as percentage of expenditures, 
overall net debt per capita, and overall net debt as percentage of the taxable market value of the 
tax base are shown. 
 Debt Service 
as % of 
Expenditures 
 Overall Net Debt 
Per Capita 
 Overall Net 
Debt as % of 
Market Value 
Low < 8% Very Low < $1,000 Low < 3% 
Moderate 8% - 15% Low $1,000 - $2,000 Moderate 3% - 6% 
Elevated 15% - 20% Moderate $2,000 - $5,000 Moderately High 6% - 10% 
High > 25% High > $5,000 High > 10% 
Exhibit #5: S&P General Obligation Ratio Credit Ranges 
Source: S&P’s “U.S. Public Finance: Key General Obligation Ratio Credit Ranges”41 
 
The metric that can most easily be compared with Puerto Rico is the overall net general 
obligation debt per capita. While Puerto Rico’s net tax-supported debt includes more than just 
general obligation bonds that total around $45 billion, its general obligation bonds are estimated 
                                                 
41 S&P Global Ratings. “U.S. Public Finance: Key General Obligation Ratio Credit Ranges.” 2019. 
https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/4755492. 
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to be around $13 billion.42 Based on the Commonwealth’s net tax-supported debt per capita of 
$16,662 per person, that means its net general obligation debt per capita is around $4,813/person. 
This would categorize the Commonwealth as a moderate level of debt. However, S&P cautions 
that ratios may be outweighed by economic, administrative, financial, debt, structural or other 
qualitative factors when assigning ratings.  
 While these threshold criteria do represent part of the credit rating process, they do not 
demonstrate a government’s willingness to meet obligations or reflect a history of late budgets or 
operational restraints. As such, rating agencies’ thresholds only serve as a starting point when 
trying to evaluate the whole picture. 
 Gluzmann, Guzman, and Stiglitz’s computations, as mentioned earlier, provide a range to 
the amount of debt that must be written-off for Puerto Rico to be fiscally sustainable given a 
chosen set of assumptions. The numbers range greatly, as the authors contest the assumptions 
made in the Fiscal Plan about structural reforms generating substantial GNP growth and other 
values used, such as the fiscal multiplier used. The relevant statistic to be analyzed is the amount 
of debt left after the debt write-off that can be successfully sustained. The authors’ calculations 
display a maximum sustainable debt range from $18.5 to $62.4 billion under the assumption that 
structural reforms have no effects on GNP growth and range from $19.9 to $69.8 billion under 
the assumption that structural reforms will substantially affect GNP growth as assumed by the 
Fiscal Plan; they generate an analysis of what would be sustainable without those assumptions in 
addition to calculating what would be sustainable under those (poorly-assumed) conditions. With 
                                                 
42 Ortiz, Luis Valentin. "UPDATE 1-Puerto Rico Wins Court Approval for Sales Tax-backed Debt..." Reuters. 
February 04, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-puertorico-bonds/update-1-puerto-rico-wins-court-approval-
for-sales-tax-backed-debt-restructuring-idUSL1N1ZZ1CQ. 
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the current estimate of a GNP around 70.6 billion43, that means a public debt to GNP percentage 
of 28.19% to 98.87% is sustainable. Puerto Rico’s current total public debt as a percentage of 
GNP was found to be 172.8%, so this analytic framework demonstrates the extent to which 
Puerto Rico must restructure. It is important to note that these calculations are based on 
projections made prior to both hurricanes and any prospective emergency aid. 
 
Proposed Comparison for Puerto Rico 
In Consideration of Municipalities 
 While the use of states as a peer group offers a simplified estimate for benchmarking 
Puerto Rico’s debt capacity, the reasoning for utilizing states as the comparison in the New 
Fiscal Plan neglected the viability of using municipalities as the benchmarking group. 
Municipalities offer an important alternative source of insight into Puerto Rico’s debt capacity. 
Much of the same reasoning that can be applied in the case for states can also be applied toward 
local governments. 
 Municipalities similarly do not own their own currency and are subject to taxing 
authorities beyond their control. They access the same debt market as that of Puerto Rico, subject 
to the same rating agencies. While the use of municipalities has similar faults to that of states 
when it comes to federal taxation, municipalities offer a better comparison in other ways. 
 Under the U.S. Constitution, state governments have the ability to establish their own tax 
structures and expenditure responsibilities. However, they are not eligible to file for bankruptcy. 
Instead, they can adjust revenues, alter disbursements, access various reserves and other liquidity 
                                                 
43 Economic Development Bank for Puerto Rico. Office of Economic Studies. Puerto Rico Annual Fact Sheet. 
October 2018. http://www.aafaf.pr.gov/assets/pr-factsheet-oct2018-aafaf.pdf. 
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measures to restore budgetary balance. While the inability for states to formally restructure debt 
through a bankruptcy process may seem concerning, the state financial system is generally 
considered mature by rating agencies such as Standard & Poor44 and has well-developed 
standards for management and transparency. 
 After eight states defaulted in the Panic of 1837, states’ borrowing capacities were more 
greatly restricted.45 The responsibility for economic development and the debt issuance 
necessary for said policies and programs shifted primarily to local governments. While states still 
have the ability to interfere with local government revenue and impose limits or regulations 
around taxation and debt issuance, in practice, local governments have had much fiscal 
flexibility. Local governments are known to rely on their own sources of funding to pay for the 
level of services of their own choosing. Therefore, local governments can perhaps provide a 
more comparable level of taxing autonomy and debt issuance ability in comparison to the 
Commonwealth. 
 Municipalities may also offer a more comparable level of administrative flexibility when 
considering the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction over the island. The GAO has concluded that in 
comparison to U.S. state and local governments, the Commonwealth’s greater outstanding 
amount of debt per capita is attributed partly to the Commonwealth’s “wider range of 
responsibilities”.46 Although the GAO did not further specify the scope of responsibility, it can 
be seen that where U.S. counties, townships, municipalities, and special-purpose local 
governments provide essential services such as education and public utilities in conjunction with 
                                                 
44 S&P Global Ratings. “U.S. Public Finance: U.S. State Ratings Methodology.” 2018. 
https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/9775517 
45 See S&P Global Ratings. “U.S. Public Finance: U.S. State Ratings Methodology.” 
46 See U.S. Government Accountability Office. Puerto Rico: Fiscal Relations with the Federal Government and 
Economic Trends during the Phaseout of the Possessions Tax Credit. 
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each other, the single jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its owned 
corporations carry out a large part of the basic and public services to its citizens, including public 
utilities, transportation, education, and law enforcement activities. 
 State governments also generally do not concern themselves with providing electricity, 
water, parks and recreational services, police and fire departments, housing services, 
transportation services and public works; the provision of services are delegated to municipalities 
while the state commissions and authorities oversee ordinances and rules.47 Puerto Rico’s 
government-owned corporations, on the other hand, heavily deal with providing services 
including electricity, water, waste removal, and transportation services (e.g. Puerto Rico 
Electricity Power Authority (PREPA), Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority (PRASA), 
Puerto Rico Metropolitan Bus Authority). Most notably, perhaps, is that PREPA and PRASA are 
the only entities authorized to provide their respective public utilities on the island, whereas that 
is not the case within an entire U.S. state. Hence, the use of municipalities as a comparison group 
given its provision of services may offer additional insight which states do not provide by 
themselves. 
 In addition, states have not defaulted for a considerably long period of time. While some 
argue that certain states may be trending towards becoming fiscally distressed in the near future, 
even if a state does default on its debt obligation, it would be considered a contractual violation 
for which creditor may sue under the Contract Clause as there is no formal bankruptcy procedure 
                                                 
47 "State & Local Government." National Archives and Records Administration. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1600/state-and-local-government. 
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for states. States may also simply have the legal authority to shed its unmet liabilities, in effect 
forcing creditors to take a deal on the state’s terms.48  
 On the other hand, municipalities have a formalized bankruptcy process through Chapter 
9 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Given that Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy claim under Title III of 
PROMESA is based off Chapter 9 processes, municipalities serve as a good comparison in 
experience. While it may be argued that other territories could present similar sociopolitical and 
geographic characteristics to that of Puerto Rico, none of them have had to go through 
bankruptcy to restructure debt. As such, it may be important to establish a peer comparison 
group that has had to go through similar legal processes and exited bankruptcy successfully to 
determine how much debt can be managed while investing sufficiently to stimulate the economy 
back on the path to recovery. 
 
In Consideration of Detroit 
 In March 2013, Kevyn Orr was appointed by the Local Emergency Financial Assistance 
Loan Board as the Emergency Financial Manager of the City of Detroit. Given the financial and 
budgetary crisis that the city was going through, Detroit was able to file for a petition of relief 
through Chapter 9, reducing long-term debt and retirement liabilities. Through the bankruptcy 
process, Detroit was also able to reinvest in its tax base through an approximately $1.5 billion 
reinvestment plan on services and create a new management team.49 
                                                 
48 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. "When States Default: Lessons from Law and History." October 12, 2017. 
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2017-economic-
commentaries/ec-201716-pensions-when-states-default.aspx. 
49 City of Detroit. “Overview of Detroit’s Plan of Adjustment. CLI-2187394v4. 
https://detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Announcements/Summary_PlanOfAdjustment.pdf 
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 Upon exiting out of bankruptcy in December 2014, Detroit shed about net $8.3 billion of 
its total outstanding obligations.50 Total bonded debt dropped from 7.2 billion to 1.85 billion.51 
Given that the Detroit bankruptcy consisted largely of unfunded pension liabilities, the 
bankruptcy judge effectively determined to prioritize those obligations over the contractual 
obligations in the GO bonds. At that time, it was uncertain how much the GO bond holders 
would be able to recover. Looking back at proceedings, there were recoveries of 74% of 
unlimited-tax GO bonds and 34% of limited-tax GO bonds.52  
 While the City of Detroit’s current state is considered generally successful in recovering, 
Moody’s still reports economic problems. Most notably, the city is still facing weak 
demographic statistics, a declining population, a high unemployment rate (13.0% as of 
November 2014), and falling key revenues from property taxes that could result in weaker credit 
quality in the short to middle term.53 
 Detroit offers a much better comparison to Puerto Rico in comparable experiences 
leading up to bankruptcy. Whereas in other municipal bankruptcies, often there was one or two 
causal factors, Detroit’s multiple cumulative problems that led to its demise is like the multitudes 
of problems faced by Puerto Rico. Detroit suffered from a similar lack of fiscal transparency 
with chronically late financial audits. Economic recession, changing demographics, high 
unemployment and low household income are also all common factors between the two 
government’s fiscal declines. 
                                                 
50 City of Detroit. “City of Detroit: Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2015.” 
I-2. 
51 City of Detroit. “City of Detroit: Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2016.” 
52 Reuters. "Report Reveals 34 Pct Recovery for Detroit Limited-tax GO Bonds." July 10, 2014. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-detroit-bankruptcy-bonds/report-reveals-34-pct-recovery-for-detroit-limited-
tax-go-bonds-idUSL2N0PL1Y620140710. 
53 Moody’s Investors Service. “Moody’s: Detroit Emerges from Bankruptcy Stronger, But Economic Hurdles 
Persist.” March 11, 2015. https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Detroit-Emerges-from-Bankruptcy-Stronger-
But-Economic-Hurdles-Persist--PR_320506. 
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 Both bankruptcy filings followed a bond default. Detroit skipped payment on $1.43 
billion of pension bonds in June 2013. On September 30, 2017, Puerto Rico and its related bond 
issuing authorities missed nearly $1.5 billion in debt service payments. 
 Since Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy process was based on Chapter 9 procedures, Detroit’s 
experience through that process can demonstrate how a municipality is able to rebound out of its 
dismal condition. The difference in a standard Chapter 9 process and Title III of PROMESA lies 
mainly in the Oversight Board and the fiscal plan requirement. Since Detroit also had an 
emergency financial manager that acted as oversight with a plan of adjustment requirement, 
Detroit can provide a more comparable experience to Puerto Rico’s situation than states that do 
not go and have not gone through the restructuring process. 
 The size of the problem is different, with Detroit roughly at $18 billion of total debt 
(including bonds and unfunded liabilities like pensions and healthcare) and Puerto Rico at 
around $74 billion in outstanding bonds and $49 billion in owed pensions54. However, numbers 
become a bit more comparable when looking at the relative size of the debt outstanding with 
respect to their population sizes. Detroit had a population in 2014 of 713,777 whereas Puerto 
Rico had a population in 2018 of around 3.166 million. As such, Puerto Rico is seen to have a 
larger but more comparable debt burden per resident than Detroit: at $38,850 per capita in 
comparison to $25,218 per capita. 
 
Detroit as Comparable Peer 
 Detroit did not provide a formal debt sustainability analysis in their bankruptcy 
proceedings. Instead, expert testimony was used to determine the relative feasibility of the Plan 
                                                 
54 Kobre & Kim LLP, Independent Investor’s Final Investigative Report, August 20, 2018. 
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of Adjustment, set forth by the presiding Judge with projections provided by Ernst & Young and 
the Emergency Manager.55 In the expert’s report, titled the Second Supplemental Report of 
Martha E.M. Kpacz Regarding the Feasibility of the City of Detroit Plan of Adjustment, it states 
“There is no single data point that defines feasibility… the reasonableness of the quantitative and 
qualitative components of the Standard can be a range of values. When looking at the 
reasonableness of assumptions and projections, most people understand that ‘reasonable’ can 
exist along a continuum. The concept remains true with respect to the current projections.”56 In 
other words, the expert determined that the proposed Plan of Adjustment was sufficiently 
reasonable and feasible without a formal analysis. 
 Although the extent of debt differ, Detroit is already on its path to recovery. In April 
2018, it reclaimed control of its own finances from the Emergency Manager by delivering three 
consecutive years of audited balanced budgets.57 While it still must file monthly financial reports 
to the commission and face continual monitoring for the next ten years, including potential 
resumed oversight if a budget deficit reoccurs, the City appears to be on the upward trend.58 
 Exhibit #7 displays the calculations of the City of Detroit’s various ratios in the years 
during their restructuring processes and following the exit out of bankruptcy. All data originates 
from the City of Detroit’s published Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) for the 
                                                 
55 United States Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division. “Expert Report of Martha E.M. 
Kopacz Regarding the Feasibility of the City of Detroit Plan of Adjustment.” Case No. 13-53846. 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/FRC_Court_Advisor_Report_-_Kopacz_-_07-18-14_474086_7.pdf. 
32. 
56 United States Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division. “Second Supplemental Report of 
Martha E.M. Kopacz Regarding the Feasibility of the City of Detroit Plan of Adjustment.” Case No. 13-53846. 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/FRC_Court_Advisor_Report_-_Kopacz_-_Supplemental_-_10-21-
14_474089_7.pdf. 5. 
57 City of Detroit. “City of Detroit: Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2018.” 
vi-vii. 
58 See City of Detroit. “City of Detroit: Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 
2018.” 
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respective fiscal years, between 2014 and 2018. Since the percentages of debt to income and of 
debt to revenue are in that year’s dollars, discounting is unnecessary, since it would apply 
equally to the numerator and denominator. There was no data available in the CAFRs for the 
total personal income in years following 2009, so the net tax-supported debt to personal income 
ratio is not calculated here. 
 
 FY ending 
June 30, 
2014 
 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2015 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2016 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2017 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2018 
Total bonded 
debt ($) 
6.4 billion 
 
7.2 billion 1.85 billion 
 
1.9 billion 1.7 billion 
General 
bonded debt 
($) 
2.170 billion 1.591 billion 1.509 billion 1.442 billion 1.335 billion 
Population 
(persons) 
713,777 713,777 677,116 672,795 672,795 
Revenues1 ($) 2.335 billion 2.345 billion 2.107 billion 1.916 billion 1.881 billion 
Debt service 
expenditures 
(principal + 
interest + 
bond issuance 
costs)2 ($) 
77.008 
million 
173.980 
million 
69.244 
million 
87.269 
million 
108.346 
million 
Exhibit #6: Detroit’s Financial Information (all units are dollars, except for population) 
Source: City of Detroit’s CAFRs from 2014 through 2018 
 
1 Revenues include both Governmental Activities and Business-Type Activities to form Total 
Primary Government revenues 
2 Debt service expenditures is from “Required Supplementary Information) Schedule of 
Revenue, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance – Budget and Actual – General Fund”, 
Note: FY 2015 and 2016 numbers are unaudited 
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 FY ending 
June 30, 2014 
 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2015 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2016 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2017 
FY ending 
June 30, 
2018 
Total debt per 
capita 
($/person) 
8,966 10,087 2,732 2,824 2,527 
Net tax-
supported 
debt per 
capita1 
($/person) 
3,040.71 2,229.45 2,233.41 2,142.99 1,983.86 
Debt service 
as % of own- 
source 
revenues2 
3.297% 7.421% 3.287% 4.554% 5.760% 
Exhibit #7: Detroit’s Debt Ratios 
 
1 Net tax-supported debt per capita from City of Detroit, Michigan CAFR for FY 2018, 
“Schedule 10 – Debt Capacity – Ratios of General Bonded Debt Outstanding (Unaudited)” 
2 Own revenues include all primary government revenues, both governmental activities and 
business-type activities (i.e. revenue from providing services) 
 
 Total bonded debt consists of both general obligation bonds backed by full faith and 
credit of the government and revenue bonds backed by the related enterprises, like public 
utilities. The general bonded debt is used here as the net tax-support debt, to exclude revenue 
bonds. Once calculated, these metrics can then be compared to the state analysis conducted 
earlier in the New Fiscal Plan. The drastic increase of debt service obligations in 2015 comes 
from the increase in principal payments due: $134.341 million as compared to $4.547 million in 
2014. This is reflected in the drastic increase of debt service to own-source revenues ratio from 
2014 to 2015. The second drastic change between FY 2015 and FY 2016 is due the carried 
through restructuring of Detroit’s bonds. As such, only FY 2016 onwards should be utilized to 
obtain what is feasible for Puerto Rico as it seeks to recover, rather go into further deficit. 
 These results demonstrate a similar or even smaller capacity for debt than the state results 
suggest. The highest 10 state average for debt service as a percentage of the government’s own-
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source revenues is 9.2%, and Detroit’s ratios all fall under that average at 3.287%, 4.554%, and 
5.760%. This is partly due to Detroit’s high percentage of revenue bonds in comparison to its 
tax-supported bonds. Detroit’s ratio of debt service to own-source revenues is more comparable 
to the U.S. state average at 4.5%.  
 The net tax-supported debt per capita in the case of Detroit ($3,040.71/person) is also 
significantly lower than the highest 10 state average ($3,779/person) even before its debt was 
restructured. Since Detroit offers another comparison for Puerto Rico in terms of debt 
sustainability while during recovery, this suggests that Puerto Rico may need to further 
restructure its debt to a greater extent than the state comparison group. 
 
Discussion and Areas for Future Research 
 Although Detroit may present as a better peer comparison to Puerto Rico than states, it is 
only a singular base of comparison. As comparisons offer a rough estimate of what is potentially 
feasible, it may be additionally beneficial to consider a larger comparison group with more cities 
to establish a better average and baseline. However, it would have to be a selected and tailored 
set of cities as opposed to the U.S. average or ten most-indebted, which includes too large a pool 
of cities that greatly vary depending on the demographics of the city residents and the extent of 
the services demanded. 
 While there is research into the various metrics that more strongly corroborated the 
progression of the financial crisis in Detroit,59 similar research for Puerto Rico does not exist. In 
                                                 
59 Stone, Samuel B., Akheil Singla, James Comeaux, and Charlotte Kirschner. "A comparison of financial 
indicators: The case of Detroit." Public Budgeting & Finance 35, no. 4 (2015): 90-111. 
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looking at the most revealing metrics to Puerto Rico’s decline ex-ante, those metrics may then be 
more heavily emphasized and monitored when creating a plan for sustainability. 
 The proposal to use Detroit as the peer comparable group is not to completely rid of other 
potential metrics and peer comparison groups. Rather, the reasoning is to provide an additional 
or alternative data point in which to consider the feasibility and viability of current restructuring 
negotiations, to inform current fights over how to distribute the existing pie. Furthermore, the 
question of feasibility ultimately falls on a spectrum. There is no definite economic model for 
what is distinctly feasible and what is not. External shocks to the system, such as an economic 
recession may be better provided for in one plan of adjustment than another. 
 All the various DSA frameworks evaluated in this paper can be taken in conjunction with 
each other to create a new DSA that argues for a certain level of debt write-off like the work of 
Gluzmann, Guzman, and Stiglitz. This research would have to reflect the updated circumstances 
of Puerto Rico, after both Hurricanes and potential federal aid revenues. Restructuring 
negotiations would be able to utilize those figures to the Commonwealth’s advantage.  
 In-depth policy proposals building off Appendix E can also be created to increase the 
future debt capacity of the Commonwealth: through stimulating the economy, increasing trust in 
the government, and funding or incentivizing development in industries with the strongest 
growth potential. 
 The Puerto Rican Governor’s proposed fiscal plans also heavily push for statehood, 
arguing that becoming a state would greatly aid the island in recovery and require the federal 
government to provide greater structural support. Should Puerto Rico become a state, then its 
debt sustainability framework would likewise change. However, the viability of this is primarily 
a political issue, and it is uncertain how likely statehood would be, especially since it has been a 
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topic of conversation for many years even before the bankruptcy. It is worth noting that the 
certified plans omit these pleas for statehood.  
 The consequences of this process may impact potential future proceedings for the other 
territories: Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa and Northern Mariana Islands. 
According to the GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands’ debt grew to 72% of its GDP.60 Given that Puerto 
Rico’s debt had only grown to 66% of its GDP in 2015, and the Commonwealth is now in 
default, the projections for U.S. Virgin Islands may be rather dismal. Financial reform in the U.S. 
as it pertains to the U.S. Territories may allow U.S. Virgin Islands to borrow at more favorable 
rates. However, this generally suggests a need for investors and the governments to be wary 
around potential defaults and general economic stability. 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Basics of Municipal Bankruptcy 
Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), 
one of the bankruptcy courts’ fundamental goals is to give debtors a “fresh start”, an opportunity 
to move forward from burdensome debts, and maximize the value creditors can receive. Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, entitled Reorganization, is the process for companies that want to 
repay their creditors while continuing to operate their business. Chapter 9, entitled Adjustment of 
Debts of a Municipality, is the comparable process for municipalities. Under Chapter 9, entities 
deemed as a “municipality’ can file for reorganizational bankruptcy with state approval. 
“Municipalities” allowed to file under Chapter 9 generally include cities, towns, villages, 
                                                 
60 U.S. Government Accountability Office. U.S. Territories: Public Debt Outlook. GAO-18-160 (Washington, DC, 
2017). https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-160 
40 
 
counties, taxing districts, municipal utilities, and school districts.61 States are prohibited from 
filing from bankruptcy under the Code because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy cases and would infringe upon state sovereignty as provided by the 10th and 11th 
Constitutional amendments.  
Chapter 9 bankruptcy, however, was not always an option. Prior to 1933, there was 
neither state nor federal bankruptcy legislation.62 In the absence of federal statutory law, 
municipal default relied on state statutes, as well as state and federal common law. While cities 
were unable to declare bankruptcy, they could and proceeded to fail to pay their debts.63 
The vast majority of Chapter 9 filings until the 2010’s were “used by tiny municipalities 
under peculiar circumstances”.64 After Vallejo, California filed in 2008 for $50 million in debt, a 
string of cities filed for increasingly large amounts in the following few years: Jefferson County, 
Alabama, and Stockton, California in 2011; San Bernardino, California in 2012; and Detroit, 
Michigan in 2013. While there were fears that Chapter 9 would be unable to handle the fiscal 
distress of such large cities, the exit of these cities from bankruptcy has demonstrated that the 
courts are able to balance the interests of the various stakeholders involved.65 
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Appendix B: Overview of Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis and PROMESA 
Puerto Rico has long-faced faced many issues that led it into its present-day fiscal crisis, 
including its complicated relationship with the United States, a declining population, increasing 
unemployment, and poor financial management. In the face of these problems that have 
exacerbated budgetary issues, its government turned towards debt markets for short-term fixes. 
In doing so, Puerto Rico incurred billions of dollars of liability. 
While there is a constitutional debt limit in place for its general obligation (GO) bonds, 
such that GO bonds cannot be issued if payments of principal and interest on the total GO debt 
for the proposed fiscal year and prior fiscal year exceed 15% of average annual Puerto Rico 
revenues66, the short-term fixes that the Puerto Rican government implemented were not 
included in those calculations to see how close the government was to the limit. To make matters 
worse, in September 2017, Hurricane Irma and Maria ravaged much of the existing Puerto Rican 
infrastructure, increasing the severity of the structural crisis. From a financial point of view, 
however, Hurricane Maria will generate disaster relief funding from the federal government, 
estimated by Puerto Rico to be around $82 billion, which will likely create a stimulus effect.67 
As Puerto Rico is defined as a “territory” rather than a “municipality” or a “state”, its 
government and its authorities were unable to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. In 1984, 
Puerto Rico was excluded from the definition of “State” in the amended Chapter 9 due to the 
Territorial Clause.68 Fundamentally, the Puerto Rican government has greater sovereignty than a 
municipality and state, yet it still exists as partially subsovereign to the federal government. For 
                                                 
66 Section 2 of Article VI of the Constitution of Puerto Rico 
67 Garcia/Bloomberg, Xavier, and Getty Images. "McKinsey Is Running Puerto Rico - and Getting Paid Millions to 
Do It." Intelligencer. April 17, 2019. http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/mckinsey-in-puerto-rico.html. 
68  Lubben, Stephen J. "Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause." Am. Bankr. LJ 88 (2014): 553. 
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instance, Puerto Ricans are considered U.S. citizens, but they are ineligible to vote in national 
elections and their representatives do not have full voting power in Congress. 
While much literature points to the failures of the Puerto Rican government, some have 
argued that its current economic problems may not be solely attributed to its decisions.69 The 
U.S. government may also have some liability in contributing to Puerto Rico’s current crisis. 
Ultimately, it is argued that the federal government maintains a responsibility towards the people 
under Puerto Rican jurisdiction and therefore needs to provide support in dire circumstances. 
Given the extent of Puerto Rico’s insolvency and the extreme need for restructuring, 
Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA) in 2016, which contained a new restructuring process under its Title III. This in-
court restructuring process resembles the bankruptcy option used by Detroit, Stockton, and San 
Bernardino.70 PROMESA also gave the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico a second restructuring 
tool through Title VI, which focused on financial debt through a largely out-of-court process. 
One of the most significant components was that PROMESA created a federal oversight 
board and put a hold on creditor lawsuits until the appointed board had been assembled. This 
federal board was given the responsibility for the restructuring negotiations and oversight of the 
Commonwealth’s finances, resembling the District of Columbia’s Control Board from 1995 to 
2001.  
Puerto Rico ultimately filed for the largest government bankruptcy in history in May 
2017 through Title III of PROMESA, owing approximately $74 billion in bond debt and $49 
                                                 
69 See Block, Cheryl D., Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: The U.S. States and 
Puerto Rico.  
70 See Jacoby, Melissa B., Presiding Over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto Rico. 
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billion in unfunded pension liabilities. In comparison, Detroit’s bankruptcy filing was for 
roughly $18 billion. 
More recently, the oversight board worked with the Puerto Rican governor to alter the 
structure of the public utility system, including Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) 
which was moved toward a more privatized structure.71 Negotiations for the restructuring of 
various other types of debt are still ongoing. The first debt-restructuring deal was completed in 
November 29, 2018 for the debt issued by the now-defunct Government Development Bank 
(GDB).72 Since the GDB was dissolved, responsibilities including government auditing and 
publishing the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) now fall to the Department of 
Treasury. The second debt-restructuring deal was completed February 12, 2019 for the sales-tax 
backed bonds known as COFINA bonds. 
In a February 15, 2019 ruling, the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals declared the 
Oversight Board to be unconstitutionally appointed as its members were not confirmed by the 
Senate, as required by the Appointments Clause. While the Boards’ actions were validated by the 
court, the First Circuit granted a 90-stay of the mandate for the President and Senate to nominate 
and confirm a new oversight board. Under the current course of action, the Board will be 
discontinued on May 17, 2019. Thus, the Board is requesting that the Circuit Court stay its 
issued mandate, pending the Supreme Court disposition on the motion.73 
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Appendix C: Summary of Causal Factors of Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy 
 The Possession Tax Credit under Code section 936 was part of a U.S. tax incentive 
system for domestic corporations to locate operations in Puerto Rico. Companies under section 
936 were spared U.S. taxes, regardless of local taxes.74 When the phase-out period ended for 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2005, businesses had much less incentive to operate 
in Puerto Rico, contributing to issues of a declining population, increasing unemployment, and 
other budgetary issues with decreased tax revenues. The government and the other businesses 
operating in Puerto Rico did not react and recover sufficiently fast in the face of the 
deindustrialization, further contributing to decreased economic activity and lower government 
revenues.75 Furthermore, the Government Development Bank (GDB) was operating in a dual 
capacity, as both fiscal agent and lender for Puerto Rico-Related Entities such as its public 
utilities. The conflicting nature of this role enabled the problematic debt management and poor 
fiscal responsibility of the Puerto Rico-Related Entities.76 
 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) categorizes Puerto Rico’s deficits into 
three categories: (1) inadequate financial management and oversight practices, (2) poor policy 
decisions, (3) prolonged economic contraction.77 The Puerto Rican government’s overall lack of 
fiscal transparency was evident through the delayed disclosure of audited financial reports. 
Furthermore, poor budgetary management led to overestimates of revenues and underestimates 
of expenditures. The struggling economy was perpetuated by outmigration and a smaller pool of 
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labor, regulatory challenges facing businesses in Puerto Rico, the high cost of importing goods 
and energy, and banking and housing struggles. While some of these factors result from federal 
policies on Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico’s internal characteristics including changing demographics 
and heavy local regulations contributed significantly as well to the faltering economy.  
 
Appendix D: Is Puerto Rico Fiscally Sustainable? 
Under the New Fiscal Plan, approved Oct. 23, 2018, the projected surpluses are 
insufficient to keep Puerto Rico fiscally sustainable after fiscal year (FY) 2034, even with the 
fiscal measures and structural reforms proposed. Reforms include infrastructure reform, 
healthcare reform, enhanced tax compliance, and pension reform. The early surpluses are 
attributed to enhanced revenues from fiscal measures and structural reforms, including funding 
for Medicaid and disaster relief. In the long run, healthcare costs are projected to outpace GNP 
growth, contributing to the fiscal gap. The inability to structurally reform in a significant manner 
will cause significant deficits. There were additional risks found to the projections. Namely, a 
sensitivity analysis of the change in Medicaid costs (growth rate of 4.6% in long term as opposed 
to current projections between 4.85% and 5.1% between FY 2023 and FY 2058) may decrease 
surplus by 35 billion after FY 2023. Baseline revenue projections are detailed in Exhibit i. 
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Exhibit i: Long-Term Fiscal Plan Projections Post- Measures and Structural Reforms 
Source: The New Fiscal Plan.78 
 
Under the revised fiscal plan draft, from March 2019, pre-contractual deficits after 
measures and reforms will begin a year later than previous projections: in FY 2035. In spite of 
the newly drafted fiscal plan’s changed projections of increased expenditures, reduced revenues, 
and reduced benefits from fiscal measures that seek to “optimize Government revenues”, the 
structural reforms that “improve the economy and drive growth” are estimated to have a much 
greater total impact over the six years on total annual GNP. Structural reforms include human 
capital and welfare reform, ease of doing business, power sector reform, and infrastructure 
reform. K-12 Education reforms is anticipated to also have an additional cumulative impact on 
GNP. This results in the one-year delay of the Commonwealth’s projected return to deficit. 
Although the draft fiscal plan has not yet been certified by the Oversight Board, its projections 
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are intended to be a more accurate reflection of the current situation than the previously 
approved New Fiscal Plan. 
On a more positive note, revenues to the commonwealth general fund totaled $259.1 
million above Oct. 23 projections in March 2019. The strong performance was attributed to the 
corporate income tax and foreign corporate excise (Act 154) tax and the recovery of economic 
activity after the hurricanes. Holding other projections constant, Puerto Rico is still not fiscally 
sustainable and able to meet all contractual debt obligations. Ongoing negotiations and structural 
reforms, including targeted investments, will increase Puerto Rico’s GNP growth rate, increasing 
its future economic stability. 
 
Appendix E: Long-Term, Possible Solutions for Greater Fiscal Sustainability and 
Debt Capacity 
 Puerto Rico’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports have been largely delayed, with 
the most recent released on June 30, 2018 for fiscal year 2015. The report for fiscal year 2016 
has yet to be published, as the Commonwealth missed the recent March 31 deadline. While 
overdue information loses relevance over time, these behaviors do not facilitate trust. These 
problems are severely damaging the credibility of the Commonwealth, forcing creditors to look 
towards the Oversight Board for accountability and insurance. Citizens are similarly unlikely to 
be confident in Puerto Rican government’s ability to recover and grow. 
 There needs to be a structure set in place to increase the transparency of the government 
and increase Puerto Rican citizens’ and creditors’ confidence. The GAO makes three distinct 
recommendations for Puerto Rico to increase budgetary transparency and reliability of Puerto 
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Rican debt. 79 First recommendation is to modify the tax-exempt status for Puerto Rico municipal 
debt. Although this would temporarily increase tax revenues from interest income from Puerto 
Rico bonds earned by investors residing outside of Puerto Rico, this policy would also decrease 
the demand for Puerto Rican debt. This may be problematic in this instance as there currently is 
not a high confidence in Puerto Rican debt, and Puerto Rico needs to regenerate its ability to 
borrow funds for capital investments and simply to generate liquidity.  
 The second recommendation is to apply federal investor protection laws to Puerto Rico, 
which require investment companies to disclose the risks associated with a bond in addition to 
adhering to other requirements. This may similarly lower the demand for Puerto Rican bonds.  
 The third recommendation is to modify SEC authority over muni-bond disclosure 
requirements, including the timely disclosure of audited financial reports. This disclosure would 
help investors make better informed decisions. 
 While all three of these recommendations may provide for greater budgetary 
transparency and reliability of Puerto Rican debt in the future, establishing a more trustworthy 
system, it cannot help Puerto Rico out of its current situation of prolonged economic contraction, 
inadequate financial management and oversight practices, poor policy decisions of deficits in 
budgets and public pension funding shortfalls. In the short-run, these policies may also lower the 
demand for Puerto Rican bonds, which could be undesirable with the current economic 
contraction. Although the need for greater transparency is clear, to create a more sustainable and 
accountable system in the future, Puerto Rico will also need to pursue economic policies. In 
looking at the projection provided by the New Fiscal Plan, the government is suffering from 
structural deficits and will be unable to be fiscally sustainable (See Appendix D). As such, 
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Puerto Rico needs to reinvest in its economy to stimulate growth to ensure a stronger, more 
diverse tax base. 
 When seeking ways to increase fiscal sustainability, a government may attempt to either 
increase revenues or reduce expenditures. A federal bailout on the side of revenues is politically 
unlikely. While tax increases may increase the government’s revenues, the tax revenue hill 
demonstrates that after a certain point, further increases cause a reduction in tax revenues, due to 
shrinking of the collectable tax base through tax evasion. Increasing tax rates is also unlikely to 
be politically salient, so a different solution should be considered. Since a reduction in essential 
services is also unlikely to be supported by the public, it may be worth looking at sectors or 
industries where there’s much growth potential. What type of agglomeration economy would be 
best fitted for Puerto Rico in the current market? Investing in Puerto Rico’s strength would 
increase the tax base and thereby also increase tax revenues. 
 A potential industry to consider is the tourism industry, given Puerto Rico’s geographical 
and natural resources advantage. Puerto Rico needs to increase its GNP rather than its GDP; 
Puerto Rico needs to generate economic value and keep that money on the island. Since the 
tourism industry brings in “new” money from the U.S. mainland or abroad, this injection of 
money may help stimulate consumption and overall economic activity. Potential incentives for 
innovation and growth in the tourism industry can include prizes, contests, targeted funding, tax 
breaks and publicity. In fact, much is already underway to increase tourism to Puerto Rico. 
 With Tourism, World Travel & Tourism Council 2020 Global Summit will take place in 
Puerto Rico, bringing many travelers and visibility to the location. Puerto Rico has officially 
created a Destination Marketing Organization, Discover Puerto Rico, which is a nonprofit entity 
that promotes destination and enhances long-term economic development of communities 
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through travel and tourism. Discover Puerto Rico is responsible for promoting the island as a 
place for leisure travel, meetings, and conventions. A recent partnership between NYC & 
Company (New York City’s official DMO) and Discover Puerto Rico80 will encourage San Juan 
trips from NYC and NYC trips from Puerto Rico in addition to a sharing of business practices.  
 These recent activities have generated much publicity for Puerto Rico as a tourism 
designation. However, more can still be done to invest in a growing industry. Most notably, 
public utilities and infrastructure need to be developed to be reliable for citizens and visitors. 
While this requires an upfront investment and short-run loss, its potential to stimulate the local 
economy would result in a substantial long-term benefit. Politicians would need to be upfront to 
garner support from citizens and frame it as an investment into a booming industry that’ll 
produce future benefits. 
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